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WHY LOOK AT ANIMALS? CREATURELY 
ENCOUNTERS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 
 
MICHAEL MALAY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay considers encounters with animals in the work of Henry David Thoreau, Stanley 
Cavell and J. M. Coetzee. More specifically, it explores what it calls µSRHWLF¶engagements 
with animals ± engagements in which our relations with nonhuman others are not cast in 
appropriative or instrumental terms. Along the way, it draws on the work of the American 
philosopher Cora Diamond. It also takes inspiration from a famous passage from George 
(OLRW¶VMiddlemarch, and offers a creaturely, environmental reading of some of the ideas 
LQYRNHGLQWKDWQRYHO:KDWLWDVNVPLJKWLWEHOLNHWRUHVSRQGWR(OLRW¶VLQMXQFWLRQto treat 
the lives of others with complete seriousness? 
 
Keywords: poetry; animal studies; ecocriticism; philosophy; literature. 
_______ 
 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life it would be like hearing the 
JUDVVJURZDQGWKHVTXLUUHO¶s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other 
side of silence. (George Eliot)  
 
This well-known sentence from Middlemarch enacts what it celebrates: it turns 
RXWZDUGV%HJLQQLQJZLWKDµYLVLRQ¶RIµRUGLQDU\KXPDQOLIH¶LWPRYHVWRZDUGs a 
ODUJHUHFRORJLFDOODQGVFDSHRQHZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKHJUDVV¶VJURZWKDQGWKHVTXLUUHO¶V
beating heart. Moving outwards, the sentence also rides on the circles of a widening 
sensibility ± PRGXODWLQJIURPDKXPDQµZH¶WRDQLQWLPDWHIRUPRIµKHDULQJ¶RWKHUV
EHIRUHHQGLQJZLWKDUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLPPHQVHDFWLYLW\WKDWµOLHVRQWKHRWKHUVLGHRI
VLOHQFH¶ 
Yet the sentence, it should be noted, LVSUHGLFDWHGRQDVXEMXQFWLYHFODXVHµ,I
ZHKDG¶7KLVPRGHRIDWWHQWLRQLWVHHPVLVGLIILFXOWWRLQKDELW,QGHHGLWVHHPV
impossible to sustain: µZHVKRXOGGLHRIWKDWURDU¶ This listening, this intense 
attunement, would destroy you. The sentence thus says two things: imagine, but also 
acknowledge the impossibility of truly imagining. The sentence begins with µYLVLRQ¶
but HQGVZLWKµVLOHQFH¶ 
The narrator does not try to resolve this tension. On the one hand, she praises 
the effort involved in imagining. On the other hand, the sentence is an injunction 
whose very terms are impossible to fulfil: the state it imagines would lead to a 
WHUPLQDOEUHDNGRZQDQRYHUZKHOPLQJRIRQH¶VVHOI Eliot has explored these dangers 
before. In The Lifted Veil (1859), for instance, she endows her narrator Lattimer with 
extrasensory abilities, so that, able to SDUWLFLSDWHLQµRWKHUSHRSOH¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ he 
FDQKHDUDµURDURIVRXQGZKHUHRWKHUVILQGSHUIHFWVWLOOQHVV¶1 For Lattimer, however, 
these abilities turn out to be debilitating: they overwhelm ± constantly, and against his 
will ± his sense of self. It seems that the narrator in Middlemarch is alert to the dark 
side of sympathy, to the possibility of total (and therefore incapacitating) absorption 
in the lives of others. Her exhortation to imagine is qualified by a caveat emptor. But 
WKHTXDOLILFDWLRQLVDOVRTXDOLILHG,WKLQNE\WKHQDUUDWRU¶VDIILUPDWLYHYLVLRQRIWKH
imagination. If unlimited sympathy is unsustainable and even impossible, one must 
also guard against being too guarded. The novel is partly an exploration of this 
proposition.  
True, even the most sensitive of people can be insensible to others: Eliot is 
realistic about this. µ$VLWLV,¶her narrator observes in MiddlemarchWKHµTXLFNHVW of 
us walk about well wadded with stupidity.¶2 Nevertheless, her narrator enjoins us to 
imagine anyway ± even if the effort is patchy and hard to sustain. One may not 
SK\VLFDOO\µKHDU¶WKH VTXLUUHO¶VKHDUWbeat, but one might imagine what that sound 
might µEHOLNH¶DQGWKLVPLJKWEHVXIILFLHQW:KDWLVDWVWDNHDIWHUDOOLVQRWWKH
success or failure of sympathetic identification but the sensibility involved in the 
imaginative effort. There is a richness to the attempt which stands independent of its 
success. 
What might it mean to stand before animals in the way described by Eliot? 
:KDWZRXOGLWµEHOLNH¶"7KLVHVVD\H[SORUHVWKDWTXHVWLRQE\ORRNLQJDWDQLPDO
encounters in the work of Henry David Thoreau and Stanley Cavell. In different 
ways, both writerVGUDPDWL]HZKDWLWPHDQVWRVHHDQLPDOVZLWKµNHHQYLVLRQDQG
IHHOLQJ¶QRWDVLGHDVV\PEROVRUDOOHJRULHVEXWDVOLYLQJEUHDWKLQJFUHDWXUHV7KH\
therefore show what it might be like to see animals as fellow others or as companion 
species, and in such a way WKDWDWWHQGVWRWKHLUµVLJQLILFDQWRWKHUQHVV¶DV'RQQD
Haraway has put it.3 This essay then engages with Elizabeth Costello (the fictional 
SURWDJRQLVWRI-0&RHW]HH¶VThe Lives of Animals) and the work of Cora Diamond 
(an American philosopher); it concludes with some brief remarks on poetry and the 
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
 
7KRUHDX¶VPRRVH 
In The Maine Woods, a record of three separate journeys to Maine between 1846 and 
1857, Thoreau reflects on the experience of disturbance before an animal ± namely, a 
GHDGPRRVHGLVFRYHUHGE\KLVWUDYHOOLQJFRPSDQLRQGXULQJDKXQWLQJH[SHGLWLRQµ+H
had found the cow-moose lying dead, but quite warm, in the middle of the stream, 
which was so shallow that it rested on the bottom, with hardly a third of its body 
DERYHZDWHU¶4 7KRUHDX¶VILUVWUHVSRQVHbetrays the instincts of a naturalist. Lacking a 
measuring tape, he fashions a gauge using a rope from his canoe, tying knots to mark 
RXWWKHPRRVH¶VOHQJWKDQGKHLJKWAll these pains he takes, Thoreau writes, because 
KHµGLGQRWZLVKWREHREOLJHGWRVD\PHUHO\WKHPRRVHZDVYHU\ODUJH¶ (MW, 153). 
Once the measurements have been taken, however, and once his companion begins to 
µVNLQWKHPRRVH¶WKHYRLFHRI7KRUHDXWKHQDWXUDOLVWLVWURXEOHGE\DQRWKHUmore 
complicated presence: 
 
I looked on; and a tragical business it was, ± to see that still warm and palpitating 
body pierced with a knife, to see the warm milk stream from the rent udder, and 
the ghastly naked red carcass appearing from within its seemly robe, which was 
PDGHWRKLGHLW>«@,QWKHEHGRIWKLVQDUURZZLOGDQGURFN\VWUHDPEHWZHHQ
two lofty walls of spruce and firs, a mere cleft in the forest which the stream had 
made, this work went on. (MW, 156-57) 
 
The discovery of the moose is, to soPHH[WHQWWKHFXOPLQDWLRQRI7KRUHDX¶V
expedition. Earlier in The Maine Woods, he explains that he has come to the woods as 
µUHSRUWHURUFKDSODLQWRWKHKXQWHUV¶LQRUGHUWRVDWLVI\KLVGHVLUHWRVHHµDPRRVHQHDU
DWKDQG¶ (MW, 133). But his reaction to the moose surprises him, prompting a range of 
unexpected feelings. 
The above passage is fascinating but particularly difficult to interpret. For a 
PRPHQW7KRUHDX¶VYRLFHVHHPVWROLIWIUHHRIWKHVFHQHDVWKRXJKKHDQGKLV
companion were being watched from above, from a detached, even cosmic 
SHUVSHFWLYH,QWKHEHGRIDVWUHDPLQWKHFOHIWRIDIRUHVWµWKLVZRUNZHQWRQ¶7KH
GHWDFKPHQWRIWKDWSKUDVHµWKLVZRUN¶LVHVSHFLDOO\PDUNHG7KRUHDX¶VFORVH
observations of the moose being skinned, a process which prompts both horror (the 
PRRVH¶VFDUFDVVLVµJKDVWO\¶DVZHOODVDGPLUDWLRQIRUWKHFUHDWXUH¶VIRUPHUGLJQLW\
LWVµVHHPO\UREH¶9DFLOODWLQJhis voice is at once engaged and detached, embedded 
and quite apart: in any case, it bears the signs of being deeply troubled. The event is 
GHVFULEHGDVDµWUDJLFDOEXVLQHVV¶DQGLQDUHSHWLWLRQRIWKDWWKHPH7KRUHDXODWHU
speaks of the µDIWHUQRRQ¶VWUDJHG\¶ (MW, 160). He has come to the woods to see 
PRRVHµQHDUDWKDQG¶EXWWKLVHQFRXQWHULVPXFKWRRFORVH. The expedition has 
somehow gone awry. 
3DUWRI7KRUHDX¶VDQ[LHW\LVH[SOLFDEOH7KHPRRVHKDVEHHQVKRWQHLWKHUIRU
its hide nor for its IOHVKEXWµPHUHO\IRUWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRINLOOLQJ him¶ (MW, 161). In 
WKLVUHJDUGWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWKLVZLWKRXWXWLOLW\± a shocking waste of life. But what 
GRHVLWPHDQWRVHHWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWKDVDµWUDJHG\¶"7KHUHLVVRPHWKLQJSRZHUIXOO\
FKDUJHGDERXW7KRUHDX¶VUHVSRQVHWKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGFRQYHQWLRQDOO\± that 
H[FHHGV,WKLQNWKHµQRUPDO¶UHVSRQVHwhich many of his contemporaries would have 
KDGWRWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWK 
During his expedition in the woods, Thoreau spends a great deal of time 
studying local plants. This fact is worth stressing, as it gives some indication of his 
VWDWHRIPLQGDWWKHWLPHRIWKHPRRVH¶VGLVFRYHU\:KHQKLVFRPSDQLRQVWXPEOHV
XSRQWKHGHDGFUHDWXUHLQGHHG7KRUHDXVD\VWKDWKHZDVµDEVRUEHG¶LQWKHDFWLYLW\RI
looking at a flower, an Aster macrophyllus (MW, 152). Part of his disturbance at the 
PRRVH¶VGHDWKFDQWKXVEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHVKRFNRIWUDQVition. The gentleness of 
botanizing, characterized by close looking and noticing, is interrupted by a different 
form of relating to the natural world, one characterized by harmful imposition. The 
µWUDJHG\¶RIWKHDIWHUQRRQLVSDUWO\WKLVORVVRIµLQQRFHQFH¶ 
It seems that this loss allows Thoreau to appreciate, in a particularly striking 
ZD\WKHYLROHQFHLQYROYHGLQKXQWLQJ7KHµKXQWLQJRIWKHPRRVH¶KHJRHVRQWR
ZULWHµPHUHO\IRUWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRINLOOLQJKLP>«@LVWRRPXFKOLNHJRLQJRXWE\
night to some wood-VLGHSDVWXUHDQGVKRRWLQJ\RXUQHLJKERU¶VKRUVHV¶7Ke moose, he 
FRQWLQXHVµDUH*RG¶VRZQKRUVHVSRRUWLPLGFUHDWXUHV¶ (MW, 161). Despite the 
severity of these remarks, however, 7KRUHDX¶VYLHZRIKXQWLQJLVQRWDWDOO
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG$OWKRXJKKHKDVµKDGHQRXJKRIPRRVH-KXQWLQJ¶DIWHUWKHPRRVH¶V
GHDWKKHDOVRUHFRJQL]HVLQWKHVDPHSDUDJUDSKWKHDSSHDORIWKHKXQWHU¶VOLIHµI 
think that I could spend a year in the woods, fishing and hunting just enough to 
sustain myself, with satisfaction.¶He FRQWLQXHVµWKLVZRXOGEHQH[WWROLYLQJOLNHD
SKLORVRSKHURQWKHIUXLWVRIWKHHDUWKZKLFK\RXKDGUDLVHGZKLFKDOVRDWWUDFWVPH¶ 
(MW, 161). 7KHUHDUHDVSHFWVWRWKHKXQWHU¶VOLIHDQGWKHKXQWHU¶VHPEHGGHGQHVVLQ
the natural world, which he refuses to disparage. As his thoughts develop, however, 
he JRHVRQWRZRQGHUZK\RWKHUVFDQQRWVSHQGWLPHLQWKHµVROLWXGHRIWKLVYDVW
ZLOGHUQHVV¶ZLWKRXt the urge to hunt animals or cut down trees: µ)RURQHWKDWFRPHV
with a pencil to sketch or sing, DWKRXVDQGFRPHZLWKDQD[HRUULIOH¶ (MW, 162). 
Thoreau is pained by the fact that, for some, engagement with nature means damaging 
it in some way. On the other hand, he does not spare himself from these critical 
PXVLQJVHYHQLQKLVFDSDFLW\DVDµFKDSODLQ¶)RUWKHµFKDSODLQ¶KHQRWHVµKDVEHHQ
NQRZQWRFDUU\DJXQKLPVHOI¶ (MW, 133)µ7KHDIWHUQRRQ¶VWUDJHG\,¶KHlater admits, 
µDQGP\VKDUHLQLWDVLWaffected the innocence, destroyed the pleasure of my 
DGYHQWXUH¶ (MW, 160). 
7KRUHDX¶VDFFRXQWLVQRWHZRUWK\IRUWKHUDQJHRIIHHOLQJLWUHFRUGV+LV
UHVSRQVHWRWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWKLVDQLPDWHGE\VXEWOHPRRGVDQGFRPSOH[WHQVLRQV
There is his aversion to the PRRVH¶VH[SRVHGIOHVKIRULQVWDQFHEXWDOVRKLVFXULRVLW\
IRUGHWDLODVWKHDQLPDOLVEHLQJGUDJJHGWRWKHVWUHDP¶VHGJH7KRUHDXZRQGHUVLIWKH
FRORXURILWVVNLQLVEHVWGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJµEURZQLVK-EODFN¶RUµSHUKDSVDGDUNLURQ-
JUD\¶ (MW, 152-53). 2UPL[HGLQZLWKKLVLQWHUHVWLQWKHKXQWHU¶VOLIHWKHUHLVKLV
visceral sense of its unscrupulousness. Finally, there is his sense of guilt and 
ownership over what has happened. Though he had not come to Maine to hunt, and 
WKRXJKKHKDGµIHOWVRPHFRPSXQFWLRQVDERXWDFFRPSDQ\LQJWKHKXQWHUV¶ through the 
woods, he accepts that he LVVRPHKRZFRPSOLFLWLQWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWK (MW, 133). Of 
course, Thoreau must have seen dead animals before: hunting scenes would have been 
difficult to avoid for someone who liked roaming in the woods. For whatever reason, 
however, the death of this particular moose cannot be ignored so easily. Indeed, it 
PDUNV7KRUHDX¶VFRQVFLHQFHDVLWGRHVKLVFRQVFLRXVQHVVDQGRQFHKLVFRPSDQLRQV
have left him to make his camp alone, his meditation reaches its apogee:  
 
As I sat before the fire on my fir-twig seat, without walls above or around me, I 
remembered how far on every hand that wilderness stretched, before you came to 
cleared or cultivated fields, and wondered if any bear or moose was watching the 
light of my fire; for Nature looked sternly upon me on account of the murder of 
the moose. (MW, 163)  
 The fire, the night and the expansiveness of the forest all prompt in Thoreau a sense 
of awe for the world around him. But the mood is compromised by the wrong which 
he feels has been committed against the moose, a wrong which involves him 
LQWLPDWHO\7KHµERWDQLFDOVSHFLPHQV¶KHVWXGLHVE\WKHOLJKWRIWKHILUHPD\UHPLQG
him of gentler hours ± but the ghost of the moose chastises and haunts him: µ1DWXUH
ORRNHGVWHUQO\XSRQPH¶(MW, 163). 
2GGO\WKLVH[SHULHQFHRIEHLQJORRNHGRQIURPDERYHUHSULVHV7KRUHDX¶V
HDUOLHUGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHPRRVH¶VVNLQQLQJin the cleft in the forest, in the middle of a 
VWUHDPµWKLVZRUNZHQWRQ¶,VWKLVinitial description perhaps the first iteration of 
being watched by the ghost of the moose ± and was that earlier ghost, as it were, 
shrugged off even as its presence was felt? Is it being addressed more directly now? 
In any case, the natural world that so absorbed Thoreau in the day rebukes him at 
QLJKW$QG7KRUHDX¶VUHVSRQVHWRXVHDSKUDVHIURP'RQQD+DUDZD\LVWRµVWD\ZLWK
WKHWURXEOH¶WRDYRLGWKDWLVVLPSOLI\LQJRUWULYLDOL]LQJWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWK5 Sitting by 
WKHILUHUHIOHFWLQJRQKLVµVKDUH¶LQWKHGD\¶VµWUDJHG\¶KHVWD\VDZDNHWRWKH
disturbance the moose has caused in him, encountering it face to face, as it were ± 
even if in ghostly form.  
 
&DYHOO¶VKorse 
In a letter to his friend and fellow philosopher Vicki Hearne, Stanley Cavell 
recounts an equally memorable encounter with an animal ± in this case a horse. 
&DYHOO¶V record is more philosophical WKDQ7KRUHDX¶VDWRQFHGHQVHUDQGPRUHVHOI-
reflexive, but it contains reflections of a similar nature, not least feelings of shame 
and awe before a nonhuman other: 
 
The horse, as it stands, is a rebuke to our unreadiness to be understood, our 
will to remain obscure $QGWKHPRUHEHDXWLIXOWKHKRUVH¶VVWDQFHWKHPRUH
painful the rebuke. Theirs is our best picture of a readiness to understand. Our 
stand, our stance, is of denial ... We feel our refusals are unrevealed because 
we keep, we think, our fences invisible. But the horse takes cognizance of 
them, who does not care about invisibility.6 
 
A number of things seem to be happening here. First, Cavell suggests that our relation 
WRWKHKRUVHLVGHILQHGE\DGHVLUHIRUNQRZOHGJHµ7KHUHLVVRPHWKLQJVSHFLILF,¶KH
ZULWHVµDERXWRXUXQZLOOLQJQHVVWROHWRXUNQRZOHGJHFRPHWRDQHQGZLWKUHVSHFWWR
horses.¶$WWKHVDPHWLPH&DYHOOZULWes that we fail to acknowledge what horses can 
µNQRZRIXV¶7KHUHLVDQµXQZLOOLQJQHVV to make room for their capacity to feel our 
SUHVHQFH¶ (AT, 115). Our relationship with the horse, in other words, is asymmetrical. 
We approach the horse as a subject of knowledge but refuse to stand before it 
unguardedly, exposed to what it might know of us.  
%XWZKDWLIKRUVHVKDYHWKHµFDSDFLW\WRIHHORXUSUHVHQFHLQFRPSDUDEO\
EH\RQGRXUDELOLW\WRIHHOWKHLUV¶ (AT, 115)? Why might we be unwilling to 
acknowledge this? In one of his essays, Cavell says that we sometimes forego 
acknowledging others because of our fear of being exposed before them. Our denial 
of others is thus partly a denial of ourselves, and this is partly how we keep ourselves 
KLGGHQ,QSDUWLFXODU&DYHOOVSHDNVRI6KDNHVSHDUH¶VIDPRXVWUDJHG\King Lear, and 
RI/HDU¶VDWWHPSWWRµDYRLGUHFRJQLWLRQ¶ZKLFKKHVHHVDVOLQNHGLQFRPSOH[ZD\VWRD
µVKDPHRIH[SRVXUH¶DQGWKHµWKUHDWRIVHOI-UHYHODWLRQ¶7 Understanding this, Cavell 
writes, can lead to a shock of recognition as we realize the ways we have also evaded 
WKHZRUNRIDFNQRZOHGJPHQW/HDULVQRWDWUDJLFILJXUHEHFDXVHKHLVµVLQJOHGRXW¶WR
VXIIHUEXWEHFDXVHKHNHHSVKLPVHOILQµKLGGHQQHVVVLOence, position; the ways people 
GR¶8 %XWVLQFH&DYHOOZULWHVZHDUHµLQHOXFWDEO\DFWRUVLQZKDWLVKDSSHQLQJ¶LQRXU
OLYHVµQRWKLQJFDQEHSUHVHQWWRXVWRZKLFKZHDUHQRWSUHVHQW.¶9 Our hiddenness, 
which also hides others from us, is not an inevitable fact about the world but 
something to which we commit. We therefore bear responsibility for what we miss or 
make present.  
$VLPLODUGHQLDORIDQRWKHURFFXUVLQ&DYHOO¶VHQFRXQWHUZLWKWKH
KRUVH:HPLVVWKHKRUVH¶VSUHVHQFHE\FDVWLQJRXUUHODWLRQVKLSwith the 
animal in primarily epistemological terms ± terms not entirely apposite to the 
embodied experience of seeing and being seen by another. Our stance is 
WKHUHIRUHRQHRIµGHQLDO¶EHFDXVHE\JUDVSLQJIRUNQRZOHGJHZHFXUWDLOWKH
possibility of understanding. As Stephen Mulhall writes in a related context: 
 
It is not, after all, too difficult to imagine ways in which the picture of a concept as 
subsuming a particular, or of concepts as ways of grasping reality, might encode a 
kind of imperialism of reason with respect to the real. Heidegger, for example, noted 
WKHHFKRRIµgreifen¶ [grasp] in the German for concept (Begriff), and the possibility it 
opens up of picturing thinking as grasping or clutching at things, even pawing or 
clawing at them, rather than (say) allowing them to make an impression on us, or 
taking them to heart.10 
 
7KHKRUVH¶VVWDQFHLQFRQWUDVWWR that of the grasping thinker, is open to what it cannot 
NQRZ$VVXFKLWSUHVHQWVDNLQGRIUHEXNHFKDVWLVLQJXVIRUµRXUZLOOWRUHPDLQ
REVFXUH¶7KHNQRZLQJKXPDQVXEMHFWLWWXUQVRXWLVWKHOHDVWUHDG\%XWWKHKRUVH
UHPDLQVXQSHUWXUEHGLWWDNHVµFRJQL]DQFH¶RIRXUµIHQFHV¶EXWGRHVQRWFDUHIRUWKHP 
(AT, 115).  
&DYHOO¶VDFFRXQWFDQEHUHDGSURGXFWLYHO\DORQJVLGH7KRUHDX¶VH[SHULHQFHof 
the moose7KHUHLVDQµXQZLOOLQJQHVV¶ZKLFK&DYHOODGPLWVWRDQGZKLFKFDQEH
discerned in Thoreau, to be entirely exposed to the animDORWKHUµ1DWXUH¶VVWHUQJD]H¶
DQGWKHKRUVH¶VµUHEXNH¶ suggest that some form of evasion has taken place (AT, 115). 
At the same time, there is a self-watchfulness in both writers that tries to take 
µFRJQL]DQFH¶RILQQHUIHQFHVWKDWKDYHEHHQEXLOWRIµUHIXVDOV¶WKDWDUHµXQUHYHDOHG¶
but powerfully active. Indeed, both accounts can be seen as painful exercises in fence-
dismantling ± SDLQIXOEHFDXVHLQ7KRUHDX¶VFDVHRQHPXVWFRQIURQWDJKRVWO\DFFXVHU
LQDGLIILFXOWWULEXQDODQGEHFDXVHLQ&DYHOO¶VFDVHWKHGLVDYRZDORILQWHOOHFWXDO
mastery over the horse means the relinquishing of control. Both Thoreau and Cavell 
DWWHPSWµWRPDNHURRP¶IRUWKHDQLPDO¶VSUHVHQFHHYHQWKRXJKWKHFRVWRIPDNLQJ
room is a profound disturbance to the self. By the end of his meditation, Thoreau 
RSHQVKLPVHOIPRUHIXOO\WRWKHPRRVH¶VGHDWKDQRFFDVLRQZKLFKLQYROYHV difficult 
self-interrogation, while Cavell gently remonstrates himself for his own deflections, 
deflections which he recognises in the hope of overcoming. 
'HQLDOVWDNHSODFHDOOWKHWLPHLQKXPDQHQFRXQWHUV:HULVNGHDOLQJRXWµOLWWOH
GHDWKV¶WRRWKHUVHYHU\GD\&DYHOOZULWHVWKURXJKµRXUVOLJKWVRIRQHDQRWKHU¶D
µZLOOIXOPLVFRQVWUXDO¶DµVKDGLQJRIOR\DOW\¶DQGWKURXJKµDQ\FRXQWOHVVVLJQVRI
VNHSWLFLVPZLWKUHVSHFW¶WRWKHµVHSDUDWHQHVVRIDQRWKHU¶11 But the risk of denying 
others is especially pronounced in the case of relations between humans and 
nonhumans. This is because the factors that we count on in human encounters ± a 
shared cultural context, for instance, or the ability to speak English ± are limited or 
even non-H[LVWHQW7KHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUµZLOOIXOPLVFRQVWUXDO¶DUHWKHUHIRUHHQGOHVV 
There is of course a rich spectrum in which this is and is not the case. In 
thinking of the language I share with my dog, for instance, I feel satisfied that we 
understand each other in certain ways, even if many things remain 
incommunicable.We share a world with each other ± and to the extent that we share a 
world, our forms of life share meaningful points of contact. When I watch my dog 
chase a bee, however, I realize that there are cases in which understanding and being 
understood are impossible. The bee¶V seems completely unavailable to me in a way 
my dog¶VOLIHLVQRW. I simply do not know how proceed with some animals ± or what 
proceeding would even look like. Even in the case of my dog, however, what I may 
sometimes take to be mutual understanding might not be understanding at all, as when 
I think my dog has understood and assented to an instruction (not to pee on the shoes 
of our house-guests), only to find that that instruction has not been understood (we 
wake to find that the shoes are wet). Or there might be moments when I point to the 
distance, indicating a dog in another field, only to see that my dog is looking at my 
finger. These are comic instances of misunderstanding, and one can list many more. 
But there is also a more substantial sense in which our attempt at mutual intelligibility 
coPHVWRDQHQGQRWVRPXFKEHFDXVHRIµPLVFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶EXWEHFDXVHWKH
grounds for what it might mean to communicate simply do not exist. As Ludwig 
Wittgenstein writes, µ$GRJFDQQRWEHDK\SRFULWHEXWQHLWKHUFDQKHEHVLQFHUH¶12 
Here Wittgenstein is not making a value-judgement about dogs but illustrating the 
radical differences between us and themµ+\SRFULV\¶DQGµVLQFHULW\¶RQO\PDNHVHQVH
only have a proper home, in inter-human communication, because of the particular 
ways in which human beings can lie to each other or be desirous of honest conduct. 
7KHUHDUHGHHSFRQQHFWLRQVLQRWKHUZRUGVEHWZHHQDFXOWXUH¶VZD\RIEHLQJDQGWKH
ZRUGVWKDWPDNHVHQVHIRULW7KHGRJ¶VLQDELOLW\WREHDµK\SRFULWH¶LVDSRZHUIXO
index of cultural difference, an indication of what Wittgenstein might call a different 
µIRUPRIOLIH¶13 
 What is significant about Cavell's encounter, however, is the sense in which 
openness to the other can continue even when our knowledge comes to an end. It is in 
this VHQVHWKDWWKHKRUVH¶VVWDQFHSURYLGHVDPRGHOIRUWKHKXPDQREVHUYHULWV
deportment is not defined by a need for knowledge but by a readiness to understand 
and be understood. But it is also in this sense that the horse rebukes us for our 
unwillingness to acknowledge what it might feel of us. As Cavell writes in a different 
context: 
 To withhold, or hedge, our concepts of psychological states from a given creature, on 
the ground that our criteria cannot reach to the inner life of the creature, is 
specifically to withhold the source of my idea that living beings are things that feel; it 
is to withhold myself, to reject my response to anything as a living being.14 
 
However, DVPXFKDV&DYHOO¶VKRUVHUHEXNHVXVLWVVWDQFHLVDOVRDQLQYLWDWLRQWR
relate to it differently, to stand before it without withholding ourselves. This includes 
resisting the movement in which our lack of knowledge turns into a curtailment of 
what the horse may know of us, a projection of our own lacunae, that is, onto the 
animal other. One can continue being open to the other without being certain what 
one is relating to. The horse is a good picture of this. 
7KLVTXDOLW\RIEHLQJUDGLFDOO\RSHQH[HPSOLILHVZKDW,ZDQWWRFDOODµSRHWLF¶
relationship to the world. It is a relationship George Eliot, Thoreau and Cavell explore 
in the passages discussed above ± and it is a relationship J. M. Coetzee explores with 
extraordinary intensity in The Lives of Animals (1999), through his fictional character 
Elizabeth Costello. If the horse is, for Cavell, our best picture of understanding, 
poetry is, for Costello, our best form of reciprocating that understanding in language.  
 
µ7he difficulty of reality¶ 
In her essay on &RHW]HH¶V The Lives of Animals, the philosopher Cora Diamond 
writes that Elizabeth Costello is trying to come to terms with a µGLIILFXOW\of 
UHDOLW\¶15 Here, Diamond is alluding to our treatment of animal others under industrial 
modernity and to &RVWHOOR¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKLVUHDOLW\A famous novelist, Costello 
has come to an Australian university to deliver a lecture and seminar, and, at liberty to 
select her own topic, has chosen to DGGUHVVZKDWVKHFDOOVWKHµKRUURUV¶ of human 
GRPLQDWLRQRIDQLPDOOLIHRIµZKDt is being done to animals at this moment in 
production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, 
in laboratories, all over the ZRUOG¶.16 According to Diamond, Costello is trying to 
grasp the immensity of this reality, to think and imagine it fully. By doing so, she is 
WU\LQJWRDYRLGZKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGµGHIOHFWLRQ¶ 
,Q'LDPRQG¶VDFFRXQWGHIOHFWLRQQDPHV a movement in which we turn away 
from or elide the complexity of an experience of life. We sometimes µGHIOHFW¶ an 
issue, Diamond says, by dishonouring an experience through the form that our 
responses take. As she explains with reference to  Cavell (from whom she borrows the 
term): 
 
Cavell writes about the philosopher who begins (we imagine) from an 
appreciation of something appalling: that I may be suffering, and my suffering be 
utterly unknown or uncared about; µand that others may be suffering and I not 
NQRZ¶. But the SKLORVRSKHU¶V understanding is deflected; the issue becomes 
deflected, as the philosopher thinks or rethinks it in the language of philosophical 
skepticism. And philosophical responses to that skepticism, e.g., demonstrations that 
it is confused, further deflect from the truth here. (Diamond, 57) 
 
In this example, what originally strikes the philosopher as appalling ±the pain of 
another ± loses its force. This is because that pain is diluted as the philosopher tries to 
WKLQNDERXWWKDWSDLQLQWKHµODQJXDJHRISKLORVRSKLFDOVNHSWLFLVP¶LHLQDODQJXDJH
which requires justification for any truth-claim about the world). Crucially, both 
Diamond and Cavell point out that that pain is further deflected by engaging with 
the sceptic on his or her terms, even if one is refuting what the sceptic says. This is 
because the issue of pain is being addressed within the wrong framework, one which 
fails to appreciate the true appallingness of what is going on (ibid.). 
,QDGGLWLRQWRµGHIOHFWLRQ¶'LDPRQGXVHVDQRWKHULPSRUWDQWSKUDVHLQKHU
HVVD\WKHµGLIILFXOW\RIUHDOLW\¶: 
 
That is a phrase of John 8SGLNH¶V which I want to pick up for the phenomena with 
which I am concerned, experiences in which we take something in reality to be 
resistant to our thinking it, or possibly painful in its inexplicability, difficult in 
that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability. (Diamond, 45-46) 
 
In 'LDPRQG¶V reading, Costello is someone who particularly tries to resist, as far as 
possible, certain deflections she sees at work in philosophical thinking with 
regard to animal others. Deflection is what happens, Diamond explains, µZKHQ we 
are moved from the appreciation, or attempt at appreciation, of a difficulty of 
reality to a philosophical or moral problem apparently in the YLFLQLW\¶ (Diamond, 57). 
In trying to avoid such a deflection,  not least by refusing the language in which 
animals are seen as a question, and in which issues are taken up and advanced, 
Costello wants to engage more fully with the material reality of our relations with 
animals, including, in this FDVHWKHµKRUURUV¶RIRXUWUHDWPHQWRIWKHPLQDEDWWRLUV
trawlers and laboratories. Something of this reality, she feels, is threatened by adopting 
a particular language ± the language of philosophy.  
This is not to belittle the importance of philosophy when it comes to clarifying 
DQGH[SODLQLQJRXULGHDV$V'LDPRQGUHPDUNVWKHUHDUHµKDUGSUREOHPV¶LQ
SKLORVRSK\DQGµXQLYHUVLW\SKLORVRSK\GHSDUWPHQWV¶DUHLQWHJUDOLQKHOSLQJXVVHH
µZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDJRRGDUJXPHQWZKDWLVGLVWRUWHGE\HPRWLRQZKHQwe are making 
DVVHUWLRQVZLWKRXWEDFNLQJWKHPXS¶ (Diamond, 58).17 Nor is it to repudiate completely 
ZKDW'LDPRQGFDOOVµGHIOHFWLRQ¶± which is, after all, part of the experience of being 
human. $V,DQ+DFNLQJZULWHVLQUHVSRQVHWR'LDPRQG¶VHVVD\µ'RQ¶WNnock 
GHIOHFWLRQ>«@. Man is the deflecting animal.¶18 Here, Hacking is not advocating 
ignorance as a virtue, nor celebrating the fact that we are sometimes closed off to 
others. Rather, he is pointing out that, in the course of a normal day, we often act in 
ways that fall short of the ideal image of the non-deflecting, open-minded person. To 
open ourselves fully to every uncertainty, exploring the hidden depths of every 
encounter, including encounters that might pose a threat to our identity, is impractical, 
undesirable, and perhaps even impossible. There are, after all, bills to pay and buses 
to catch. One might say that we deflect as a matter of course, as a way of just getting 
by in the world. But when Diamond remarks that certain philosophical arguments 
block us from appreciating a difficulty of reality, in this case an aspect of our 
relationship with other animals, she is saying something much more particular than 
+DFNLQJ¶VJHQHUDOFODLPWKDWµ0DQLVWKHGHIOHFWLQJDQLPDO¶ She is pointing out the 
ways in which certain modes of thought involve deflection, or, more strongly, the 
ways in which deflection is built into certain ways of relating to the world. The refusal 
to engage with reality, that is, may not only happen in moments of ignorance or 
absent-mindedness, but in the very midst of our thinking life. And Costello, for 
Diamond, is a figure who tries to overcome this kind of deflection:  
 
What I have meant to suggest by picking up &DYHOO¶V use of the term µGHIOHFWLRQ¶ 
is that the hardness there, in philosophical argumentation, is not the hardness of 
appreciating or trying to appreciate a difficulty of reality. In the latter case, the 
difficulty of reality lies in the apparent resistance by reality to RQH¶V ordinary mode 
of life, including RQH¶V ordinary modes of thinking: to appreciate a difficulty of 
reality is to feel oneself being shouldered out of how one thinks, how one is 
apparently supposed to think, or to have a sense of the inability of thought to 
encompass what it is attempting to reach. Such appreciation may involve the 
profound isolation felt by someone like Elizabeth Costello (Diamond, 58±59).19 
 
In remarking upon &RVWHOOR¶V µLVRODWLRQ¶ LQ&RHW]HH¶VQRYHOOD, Diamond seems to 
have in mind various instances where Costello alienates herself from other 
characters. John, &RVWHOOR¶Vson, thinks that his mother has become too µLQWHQVH about 
the animal EXVLQHVV¶ (LA, 66). And Norma, &RVWHOOR¶V daughter-in-law, thinks 
Costello has withdrawn from the arena of rational thought (LA, 48-49). Then there are 
instances where Costello makes controversial comparisons between factory farming 
and the Holocaust, an analogy which offends various characters in the text, none 
more so than Abraham Stern (a character of clearly Jewish origins), who refuses 
to attend a dinner held in &RVWHOOR¶VKRQRXU (LA, 49-50).20 
But &RVWHOOR¶V isolation from others is also much more subtle and pervasive, in 
that, apart from seeing the µDQLPDO EXVLQHVV¶ differently, she often finds herself 
unable to use the language of her peers. Her isolation is, among other things, deeply 
linguistic. &RHW]HHGUDZVRXUDWWHQWLRQWR&RVWHOOR¶VGLIIHUHQFHVLQDQXPEHURI
ways. Recall, for instance, that Costello is a famous novelist, speaking to a university 
audience as an invited guest. Her audience, we can assume, is well- versed in the 
protocols of critical debate, and, in the context of a university lecture, it probably 
expects her to understand and adopt these protocols too. But Costello is a novelist ± a 
point she emphasizes repeatedly ± and this turns out to be a crucial source of tension 
in the novella. She wants to approach animal others primarily in literary and 
imaginative terms and not in the philosophical or critical terms of her interlocutors. 
This makes her impatient with academic debate, and she is often unwilling or 
unable to clarify herself in the ways desired by others. µ, was hoping not to have 
to enunciate SULQFLSOHV¶ Costello says in response to a question from an audience 
member. µ,I principles are what you want to take away from this talk, I would have 
to respond, open your heart and listen to what your heart VD\V¶ (LA, 37). One can only 
imagine how, in the context of university lecture, this would have baffled (or perhaps 
even irritated) &RVWHOOR¶VTXHVWLRQHU 
From time to time, Costello shows an awareness of how she might be baffling 
others. She also recognizes that her remarks might be taken as sentimental or even 
irrational. µ, want to find a way of speaking,¶ she says at one point, that is µFRRO 
rather than heated, philosophical rather than polemical.¶ This is the kind of language, 
Costello continues, in which µZHcan discuss and debate what kind of souls animals 
KDYH¶ or µZKHWKHU they reason or on the contrary act as biological DXWRPDWRQV¶ (LA, 
22). But this philosophical language ± WKHODQJXDJHRIµAristotle and Porphyry, of 
Augustine and Aquinas, of Descartes DQG%HQWKDP¶± is also precisely what Costello 
wants to avoid. 7KLVLVEHFDXVHSKLORVRSKLFDOGLVFXVVLRQRIµWKHDQLPDO¶LQKHUYLHZ 
deflects the singularity of animal others by approaching them in the form of 
philosophical questions. Her refusal to use the language of Descartes and Bentham, 
thenRUHYHQWKHODQJXDJHRIµ0DU\0LGJOH\DQG7RP5HJDQ¶HPHUJHVIURPKHU
desire to avoid the reduction of animal otherness into an issue or a question. That 
language partly tempts her, not least because it seems to offer a way of getting a grip 
on a difficulty of reality, but it is one that she also declines to take up. µ[S]omething in 
me UHVLVWV¶ that language, Costello says, µIRUHVHHLQJ in that step the concession of 
the entire EDWWOH¶ (LA, 25). 
Resisting a particular philosophical language is of crucial importance to 
Costello. Indeed, on certain occasions it is a matter of life and death ± or rather 
a matter of how we appreciate or fail to appreciate life and death. This is 
especially clear in &RVWHOOR¶V debate with Professor Thomas 2¶+HDUQH an academic 
philosopher who has been invited to respond to her lecture on animals. For the most 
part, the debate proceeds in a calm and civilized manner. 2¶+HDUQH raises a 
number of substantial objections to &RVWHOOR¶V lecture, to which she responds 
forcefully but politely. The tone of the debate changes, however, when 2¶+HDUQH 
raises the topic of death. Animals, according to 2¶+HDUQH do not µunderstand 
death as we GR¶ death is µMXVW something that KDSSHQV¶ to animals, µVRPHWKLQJ 
against which there may be a revolt of the organism but not a revolt of the soul¶. 
µ$QG the lower down the scale of evolution one goes, the truer this is. To an 
insect, death is the breakdown of systems that keep the physical organism 
functioning, and nothing PRUH¶ (LA, 63). &RVWHOOR¶V response is direct and curt, but 
also, in the context of an academic debate, unusually impassioned: 
 
Anyone who says that life matters less to animals than it does to us has not held 
in his hands an animal fighting for its life. The whole of the being of the animal is 
thrown into that fight, without reserve. (LA, 65)  
 Costello admits that WKHµILJKW¶RIRWKHUDQLPDOVDJDLQVWGHDWKPD\ODFNWKHLQWHOOHFWXDO 
dimension of the human fight, but she also argues that it is µQRW the mode of being of 
animals to have an intellectual KRUURU¶ Their µZKROH being,¶ she continues, µLV the 
living flesh¶(ibid.). Then Costello does something remarkable. She points out the 
weakness of everything she is saying: 
 
If I do not convince you that is because my words, here, lack the power to 
bring home to you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintellectual nature, of that 
animal being. That is why I urge you to read the poets who return the living, 
electric being to language. (ibid.)  
 
Costello feels she has reached the limits of what can be said between herself and 
2¶+HDUQH at least in the terms of their current discussion. There is something amiss, 
she realizes, about the form their dialogue has taken, in which positions are staked 
out through arguments. 2¶+HDUQHKDVEHHQGHIHQGLQJ a certain notion, namely that 
animals do not have an µLQWHOOHFWXDO KRUURU¶RI death, a position which Costello 
thinks mischaracterizes the animal response to death. However, precisely at the 
point where &RVWHOOR¶V argument stands in need of explanation, and where she might 
be expected to adduce certain examples, she stops short: µP\ words >«@  lack the 
power to bring home to you the ZKROHQHVV>«@ of that animal EHLQJ¶(ibid.). At a 
crucial moment in the debate, Costello breaks off from a particular way of speaking, 
from a particular manner of continuing. And she turns to poetry: µ,urge you to read 
the poets.¶ 
 
RLONH¶VSDQWKHU+XJKHV¶VMDJXDU 
But what is this thing called poetry? What can it µGR¶ that academic debate cannot? 
Costello explores these questions in a seminar entitled µ7KH Poets and the $QLPDOV¶
which takes place the day after her lecture and examines the connections between our 
forms of thought and the ways in which we acknowledge or refuse to acknowledge 
nonhuman others.. As in her engagement with the philosophers, &RVWHOOR¶V 
treatment of poetry is patchy: she skates over intricate historical questions 
connected to particular writers and ideas, and offers unsystematic readings of animals 
in poetry, confining her analysis to a handful of poems. Unlike her engagement with 
philosophy, however, which is mostly antagonistic, &RVWHOOR¶V tone in this seminar 
is more affirmative. She finds in poetry an entirely different mode of relating to 
the world, one which allows for the kind of sympathetic attachment she thinks 
philosophy has denied itself in relation to animal life. 
Costello never explicitly spells out a theory regarding the relations between 
poetry and animal life. But it soon becomes clear that a definition would be 
antithetical to her purposes, for what seems to attract her in poetry is precisely its 
indefinability, its wild resistance to paraphrase. Nevertheless, a kind of thesis 
emerges in her reading of poetry about animal life. Some poems, it seems, are 
capable of their own deflections in relation to animal others ± while other poems 
seem to resist this especially well. Costello explores both kinds of poems. 
&RVWHOOR¶VVHPLQDUEHJLQV with a reading of µ7KH 3DQWKHU¶(1903) by the 
poet Rainer Maria Rilke. When Rilke wrote this poem, he was under the counsel of 
Auguste Rodin, who apparently urged the poet to observe animals at the Jardin des 
Plantes in Paris. Studying the world with a QDWXUDOLVW¶V precision, Rodin said, was 
integral to his artistic training. The result of this advice was µ7KH 3DQWKHU¶ one of 
5LONH¶Vmost translated poems. 
 
The lithe swinging of that rhythmical easy stride  
which circles down to the tiniest hub 
is like a dance of energy around a point 
in which a great will stands stunned and numb. 
 
The poem LVUDQNHGDPRQJ5LONH¶VILQHVWZRUNV According to Charlie Louth, the 
poem µSURYLGHG a standard concentrated XWWHUDQFH¶ against which Rilke would 
measure his future writing; and according to T. J. Reed, the poem µGHVFULEHV with an 
exactitude a zoologist can DGPLUH¶21 Rilke seems to µbecome the SDQWKHU¶LQWKLV
poem, William Pratt ZULWHVµSDFLQJ in his cage in the PHQDJHULH¶ of the zoo.22 For 
Costello, however, there is something amiss about poem. The panther is powerfully 
evoked, but its energy seems to be projected onto it. In fact, the panther is really a 
µVWDQG-in for something HOVH¶, she argues. Its µGDQFH of energy around a FHQWHU¶ is 
an µ image that comes from physics, elementary particle SK\VLFV¶ And µ5LONH does 
not get beyond this point ±  beyond the panther as the vital embodiment of the kind 
of force that is released in an atomic H[SORVLRQ¶ (LA, 50). His animal is a trope for 
trapped energy ± and it is energy, not the animal, that is the subject of 5LONH¶VSRHP 
Costello finds a different spirit at work in the poems of Ted Hughes, whom 
VKHVD\VLVµZULWLQJ against 5LONH¶ (LA, 50). As she remarks of two of +XJKHV¶V 
poems, µ7KH -DJXDU¶ (1957) and µ6HFRQG*ODQFH at a -DJXDU¶(1967): 
 
He uses the same staging in the zoo, but it is the crowd for a change that stands 
mesmerized, and among them the man, the poet, entranced and horrified and 
overwhelmed, his powers of understanding pushed beyond their limit. (LA, 50-51) 
 
Against Rilke, whose animal is a µVWDQGLQ for something HOVH¶ Hughes feels µKLV way 
toward a different kind of being-in-the-ZRUOG¶ (LA, 51). For him µLW is a PDWWHU>«@QRW 
of inhabiting another mind but of inhabiting another ERG\¶ (ibid). This places 
Hughes in contact with what might be called a µGLIILFXOW\ of UHDOLW\¶ in that he 
confronts something which resists his ordinary forms of thought. What Cora 
Diamond says of Elizabeth Costello is true of Hughes¶VH[SHULHQFHKHUH: µVKRXOGHUHG 
RXW¶ from how he LVµDSSDUHQWO\ supposed to WKLQN¶DERXWWKHZRUOG he encounters a 
limit to his understanding with respect to the jaguar, an animal which brings home 
to him the µLQDELOLW\ of thought to encompass what it is trying to UHDFK¶  (Diamond, 
58).  
Personal observation was central to the later poem Hughes published about a 
MDJXDUµ6HFRQG*ODQFHDWD-DJXDU¶µ,¶PKDYLQJDSOHDVDQWWLPHDWWKH>/RQGRQ@
Zoo,¶KHZURWHLQDOHWWHUILYH\HDUVEHIRUHWKHSRHP¶VSXEOLFDWLRQµ,KDYHDVHDVRQ
ticket & go nearly every day & draw animals & look at them a bit more closely than I 
have done heretofore.¶23 2QHUHVXOWRIORRNLQJµPRUHFORVHO\¶ZDVWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRI
concrete details. Images and associations are not projected upon the creature, as in 
5LONH¶Vµ7KH3DQWKHU¶EXWVHHPWRHPHUJHIURPWKHVSHDNHU¶VFORVHREVHUYDWLRQRI
how the jaguar actually acts and moves: 
 
Skinful of bowls he bowls them, 
The hip going in and out of joint, dropping the spine 
With the urgency of his hurry 
Like a cat going along under thrown stones, under cover, 
Glancing sideways, running 
Under his spine. 
 
There is a complex interplay between rhythm and experience here. The repetitions of 
FHUWDLQVRXQGVµEowOV¶µWKUowQ¶DQGVWonHV¶DVZHOODVµurgency¶DQGµhurry¶
HVWDEOLVKHVDGRPLQDQWSDWWHUQRIORQJµR¶DQGVKRUWµXU¶DQGµHH¶VRXQGVZKLFKLQ
combination with the repetitiRQRIµXQGHU¶µunder WKURZQVWRQHV¶µunder FRYHU¶
µ8QGHUKLVVSLQH¶KDVWKHHIIHFWRISURSHOOLQJWKHSRHPIRUZDUGDVZHUHDGLQ
anticipation of similar cadences. Just as the poem surges forward, however, there is a 
sense that it also looks back at itsHOIµ6NLQIXORIERZOVKHERZOVWKHP¶IRULQVWDQFH
LVQRWDEOHQRWRQO\IRULWVGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHEODFNPDUNVRQWKHMDJXDU¶VVNLQEXWIRU
LWVGDULQJUHSHWLWLRQRIµERZOV¶DZRUGZKLFKLQLWVILUVWLWHUDWLRQLVXVHGDVDQRXQ
µ6NLQIXORIERZOV¶EXW WKHQTXLWHVXGGHQO\DVDYHUEµKHbowls them). Through this 
ZHLUGGHVFULSWLRQWKHOLQHIRUFHVDMDUULQJUHWURVSHFWLYHJODQFH6LPLODUO\µKXUU\¶
FRQWDLQVWKHDXGLWRU\PHPRU\RIµXUJHQF\¶MXVWDVWKHWKLUGLWHUDWLRQRIµXQGHU¶
µ8QGHUKLVVSLQH¶PDNHVXVFRQVFLRXVRILWVHDUOLHULWHUDWLRQVµXQGHUWKURZQVWRQHV¶
µXQGHUFRYHU¶7KHSRHP¶VUHSHWLWLRQVVZHHSXVEDFNZDUGVLQWKHPRYHPHQWRIJRLQJ
forwards, a dense layering of sounds and energies which seem, at the verbal level, to 
mirror something of the MDJXDU¶VKXQFKHGµUXQQLQJ¶WKHGXFNLQJPRYHPHQWRILWV
KHDGDQGWKHVZD\RILWVKLSDVLWJRHVµLQDQGRXWRIMRLQW¶8QOLNHµ7KH3DQWKHU¶LQ
ZKLFKWKHFUHDWXUHLVDµVWDQG-LQIRUVRPHWKLQJHOVH¶WKHFUHDWXUHLQ+XJKHV¶VSRHP
seems to be muscling its wD\LQWRODQJXDJHµ/LNHDFDW>«@XQGHUFRYHU¶ 
Of course, as with any poem about any animal, Hughes cannot escape the 
prism of language. The jaguar is necessarily described within an all-too-human 
framework and so tangled up with human concerns and projections. Later in the 
poem, Hughes seems to acknowledge this through a number of extreme (and self-
FRQVFLRXVO\RXWODQGLVKGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHMDJXDU1HYHUWKHOHVVHYHQDV+XJKHV¶V
poem owns up to these inescapable contingencies, to the fact that we inevitably 
anthropomorphize other creatures by describing them, his poem also manages to 
JHVWXUHWRZDUGVWKHMDJXDU¶VRWKHUQHVVQRWE\WUDQVFHQGLQJILJXUHVRIVSHHFKDQ
impossible task in a poem), but by underscoring the provisional nature of each of his 
descriptions. By amassing a dizzying array of images to describe the creature, only to 
then summarily dispense with those images, the poem foregrounds both the 
inadequacy of its previous images and a sense that future images, however precise, 
will also fail to capture something of how the jaguar moves. The portrait Hughes 
completes is also a monument to the impossibility of a complete portrait. The jaguar 
moves with a  
 
A terrible, stump-legged waddle, 
Like a thick Aztec disemboweller, 
Club-swinging, trying to grind some square  
Socket between his hind legs round, 
Carrying his head like a brazier of spilling embers, 
And the black bit of his mouth, he takes it 
Between his back teeth, he has to wear his skin out, 
He swipes a lap at the water-trough as he turns 
Swivelling the ball of his heel on the polished spot, 
Showing his belly like a butterfly.  
 
Again, the poem unfolds new images and phrasings in quick succession, as though to 
NHHSSDFHZLWKWKHFUHDWXUH¶VPRYHPHQWVµ$]WHFGLVHPERZeOOHU¶JLYHVZD\WR
µVTXDUHVRFNHW¶ZKLFKJLYHVZD\WRµKLQGOHJVURXQG¶ZKLFKJLYHVZD\WRµVSLOOLQJ
HPEHUV¶ZKLFKJLYHVZD\WRµEODFNELW¶ZKLFKFXOPLQDWHVLQWKHVXUSULVLQJLPDJHRIµD
EXWWHUIO\¶+XJKHV¶VDVVRFLDWLRQVIORZZLWKDQXUJHQWPRPHQWXPQHYHr quite at rest. 
At first glance, there seems to be very little that holds these images together; on closer 
inspection, however, one can see how particular images seem to anticipate the next. 
µ*ULQG¶DQGµVRFNHW¶IRULQVWDQFHFOHDUO\ERUURZIURPDPHFKDQistic vocabulary, and 
so prepare the ground for µ&DUU\LQJKLVKHDGOLNHDbrazier of spilling embers¶DQ
image which suggests a steam-engine overloaded with fuel. This description 
DQWLFLSDWHVLQWXUQWKHµWKHblack ELW¶RIWKHMDJXDU¶VPRXWKDQLPDJHZKLFKVXJJHVW
coal or ash, but which in any case contains a memory of the now burnt-out embers. In 
WXUQWKHµa¶DQGµt¶VRXQGVLQµEODFNELW¶SUHSDUHVXVIRUµback WHHWK¶ just as the 
description of the jaguar wearing LWVµVNLQRXW¶DQWLFLSDWHVµSROLVKHG¶Rushing from 
images of fire to water, from square sockets to round legs, from Aztec disembowellers 
to butterflies, the poem brings together dynamic opposites, finding in the jaguar a site 
of multiple forces and energies. 
,WLVLQWKLVVHQVHWKDW+XJKHV¶VSRHPPD\EHVDLGWRHQFRGHDQµHFRORJLFDO
HWKLF¶WKDWLVDEVHQWIURP5LONH¶VSRHP,I5LONH¶Vµ7KH3DQWKHU¶XVHVWKHDQLPDODVD
symbol, +XJKHV¶Vµ6HFRQG*ODQFHDWD-DJXDU¶HQJDJHVZLWKWKHFUHDWXUHDVDQ
embodied other, one with a particular way of moving and being. Like the jaguar, 
PRUHRYHUZKLFKDWµHYHU\VWULGH¶VHHPVWRµWXUQDFRUQHU_ LQKLPVHOIDQGFRUUHFWLW¶
+XJKHV¶VSRHPLVIXOORIUHYLVLRQVDQGUHFDOLEUDWLRQVIt conscientiously breaks apart 
its own imagHVXQGHUVFRULQJWKHFUHDWXUH¶VRWKHUQHVVE\UHIXVLQJWRDOORZDSDUWLFXODU
metaphor or conceit for the jaguar to reify into an emblem. In this way, the poem 
redeems the etymology of poetry as poesis ± poetry, that is, as a process of making, 
creating, producing. The poem also suggests how the restless and transformative 
activity of poetic making and remaking might offer (non-instrumental) forms of 
relating to animal others, specifically forms of description which do not simply re-
embed the animal other into what we know, but which find a way of acknowledging ± 
even in the act of describing ± WKHRWKHU¶VRWKHUQHVVWRZKDWZHNQRZThis is not to 
VD\WKDWWKHMDJXDUE\WKHHQGRI+XJKHV¶VSRHPLVVRPHKRZFDSWXUHGLQLWV full 
totality. On the contrary, the poem cannot be more than its own conceits; even its 
most precise images reduce the jaguar to a series of verbal figures. By means of 
continually unsettling language, however, there is a sense in which the poem 
µUHOHDVHV¶WKHFUHDWXUHE\IRUHJURXQGLQJWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKHMDJXDULVDOZD\VRWKHU
WRWKHSRHP¶VLPDJHV7KHSRHPDIILUPVWKDWZHFDQRQO\HYHUµJODQFH¶DWWKHMDJXDU
and that its otherness is finally beyond the figures we make for it. Rather than positing 
this DVDORVVKRZHYHUWKHSRHPFHOHEUDWHVWKHDOWHULW\WKDWµJODQFLQJ¶LPSOLHV± by 
itself becoming glancing. Unable to free the animal in reality, in the actual setting of 
the zoo, this homage is perhaps the only real gesture (if still a feeble one) available to 
the poem. RecognizLQJWKHLQWROHUDELOLW\RIWKHFUHDWXUH¶VFDJHGFRQGLWLRQWKHSRHP
refuses to burden the creature further by pinning it down in words. 
The difference between Rilke and Hughes is nicely captured by the phrase 
µEHFRPLQJ-DQLPDO¶ a term used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus.24 As Randy Malamud explains in relation to µ7KH 3DQWKHU¶ 5LONH¶V 
poem fails the task of µEHFRPLQJ-DQLPDO¶ a task which would require seeing µWKH 
whole animal and its OLIH¶ over and above µLWV iconically reductive cultural 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶25 In other words, Rilke sees the panther in all-too-human terms: his 
poem is not so much an encounter with an animal as an encounter with an idea of 
energy that the animal embodies. Indeed, this was partly the point: as Ralph 
Freedman REVHUYHVRIWKLVSHULRGLQ5LONH¶VFDUHHUthe poet was striving to achieve a 
sculptural stillness in his poems. µ7KH panther has become wholly thing¶ Freedman 
writes, and µWKLV was the most advanced development so far in 5LONH¶V 
professional life: the absorption, interpretation, and reinterpretation of 5RGLQ¶V 
new sculpture.¶26 But if this text marked an artistic breakthrough for Rilke, a 
thoroughgoing assimilation of 5RGLQ¶V influence, the poem is troublingly uncritical 
in its relation to the actual panther. As Malamud writes, the µSRHW and audience 
recognise this DQLPDO¶V intensity and his soul,¶ but they µUHPDLQ powerless within 
the text to celebrate this, or to ameliorate the DQLPDO¶V constraint >«@. There is no 
emotion possible other than pathos.¶27  
Malamud might be asking too much of Rilke here. Short of physically 
liberating the animal, it is not clear how Rilke might µDPHOLRUDWH¶ the SDQWKHU¶V life in 
captivity. Nor is it clear LIµSDWKRV¶ is entirely undesirable: the emotion, after all, 
might be the catalyst for a more fully- realised sympathy. As a comment on the 
imaginative trajectory of µ7KH 3DQWKHU¶KRZHYHU 0DODPXG¶V general point is 
convincing: because Rilke approaches the panther as an aesthetic µWKLQJ¶ and 
because he is a sentimental and uncritical visitor to the zoo, the animal is further 
imprisoned by the concepts we make for it. The panther, to adapt a related comment 
Malamud makes elsewhere, lacks those µOLQHV of IOLJKW¶ which µKLJKOLJKW the 
DQLPDO¶V mobility DQGDJHQF\¶ and which provide animals with µSDWKV of escape 
from the captivity and LQHUWLD¶WKDW µSODJXHDQLPDOVLQ so many of their modern 
cultural LQFDUQDWLRQV¶28 5LONH¶VSDQWKHULQRWKHUZRUGVLVQHYHUPRUHWKDQ5LONH¶V
SDQWKHURUWKHGRPLQDQWFXOWXUDOLGHDRISDQWKHU¶VLQKLVWLPH  
Hughes approaches his jaguar differently. If Rilke describes his panther 
with the eye of an artist, sculpting the animal into an expression of trapped and 
deflated energy, Hughes is partly sculpted by the animal: his engagement with the 
jaguar mesmerizes him. This is because Hughes tries to inhabit another body ± and 
in so doing relinquishes some degree of intellectual control over the other. He 
does not approach the animal as a subject of knowledge &DYHOO¶V horse), or as an 
artistic challenge 5LONH¶V panther), but as an embodied other that must be met 
halfway. As Costello remarks, 
 
Hughes is feeling his way toward a different kind of being-in-the-world, one which 
is not entirely foreign to us >«@ .  In these poems we know the jaguar not from 
the way he seems but from the way he moves > « @   The poems ask us to 
imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit that body. (LA, 51)  
 
To imagine the jaguar in this way is to recognize the DQLPDO¶V embodied vitality. The 
jaguar is not only something to look at, but something that looks. It is full of µFXUUHQWV 
of OLIH¶ before which the µFURZG stands PHVPHULVHG¶ ,QWKLVZD\+XJKHV¶Vpoem 
can lead to what Mark Payne calls, in another context, a µSHUFHSWXDO FKDQJH¶LQRXU
relations with animals. µ7R see oneself seen,¶KHZULWHV µis to become aware of 
oneself as an object of another DQLPDO¶V perception, then as one object among others 
in this perception, and then, finally, as a participant in an intersubjective encounter 
as it is experienced by another subject.¶29And that, as Costello tells her audience, µLV 
the kind of poetry I bring to your attention today: poetry that does not try to find an 
idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an 
engagement with KLP¶ (LA, 51). 
&RVWHOOR¶V analysis is not without its SUREOHPV,QKHUUHDGLQJRI+XJKHV¶V
jaguar poems, for instance, she acknowledges but does not engage with the µHWKLFV of 
caging large DQLPDOV¶ (LA, 51). If anything, this issue should be central to our 
reading of the text. Since the poem cannot be separated from zoos as institutions, 
it cannot be read as a straightforward encounter between a human being and a 
nonhuman other. It is also a massive oversimplification for Costello to speak of 
µSKLORVRSK\¶ and µSRHWU\¶ as though they were clearly separable, each characterized 
by a set of common themes and properties. In many cases the distinction is not only 
simplistic but untenable. /XFUHWLXV¶ De rerum naturaIRULQVWDQFHRU2YLG¶V 
Metamorphoses, are works of both poetry and philosophy, and these elements 
cannot be separated without severely distorting the texts. We might also think of 
modern examples where poetry is in intimate conversation with philosophical 
themes, as in the work of Wallace Stevens, or philosophy which moves towards 
µO\ULFDO¶ or µSRHWLFDO¶ forms, as in the writing of Gaston Bachelard or Maurice 
Blanchot. In these cases, µSKLORVRSK\¶ and µSRHWU\¶ are deeply connected: they form 
crisscrossing strands of a particular ZULWHU¶V voice. 
Finally, we might also resist &RVWHOOR¶VXQFULWLFDOFHOHEUDWLRQRIWKHµKHDUW¶DV
WKHµVHDW¶RIV\PSDWK\WKDWµIDFXOW\¶ZKLFKµDOORZVXVWRVKDUHDWWLPHVWKHEHLQJRI
DQRWKHU¶ (LA, 34). ,Qµ5HRSHQLQJWKH4XHVWLRQRIWKH+XPDQDQGWKH$QLPDO¶
Dominick LaCapra argues that we should be wary of such over-reaching formulations, 
FULWLFL]LQJ&RVWHOORIRUµVHHPLQJO\DFFHSWLQJWKHTXHVWLRQDEOHLGHDVWKDWV\PSDWK\LV
identification with the other and that such identification is itself a preservative against 
FUXHOW\DQGJHQRFLGDOEHKDYLRXU¶30 In particular, LaCapra argues that thinking of 
sympathy in these terms ± QDPHO\DVDµIXOO\LGHQWLILFDWRU\IRUP¶RIHQJDJHPHQW± is 
µYHU\SUREOHPDWLFDVDPRUDORUHWKLFDOVHQWLPHQWLQWKDWLWLQGXFHVSURMHFWLYHRU
LQFRUSRUDWLYHLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶31 Sympathetic projection, in other words, may end up 
eliding the other by turning its otherness into a version of the same, even, 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\DVRQHWULHVWRUHVLVWWKDWYHU\PRYH7KHµW\SHRIHPSDWK\RU
compassion Costello seems to be seeking,¶/D&DSUDDGGVµZRuld be better construed 
as an affective response that may involve elements of identification but nonetheless is 
also informed both by acknowledgement of the other as other and by the realisation 
that sympathy or empathy alone, however desirable on an ethical level, is not 
VXIILFLHQWDVDUHVSRQVHWRVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOSUREOHPV¶32 To be fair to her, Costello 
is partly aware of the problems posed by an unqualified conception of sympathy, an 
awareness that comes out most forcefully when she criticizes Hughes for the 
µSULPLWLYLVP¶RIKLVWKRXJKWµ,WLVGHHSO\PDVFXOLQH¶DQGµPDVFXOLQLVW¶VKHUHPDUNV
DQGLWVµUDPLILFDWLRQVLQWRSROLWLFVDUHWREHPLVWUXVWHG¶ (LA, 52). In any case, 
KRZHYHU/D&DSUDLVULJKWWRVXJJHVWWKDW&RVWHOOR¶VUHPDUNVRQV\PSDWK\DQG
compassion ± remarks that are usually couched in aesthetic and ecological terms ± 
UHTXLUHµVXSSOHPHQWDWLRQE\QRUPVDQGSURFHVVHVOLQNHGWRIRUPVRIVRFLR-political 
SUDFWLFH¶$OWKRXJKVXFKFRQVLGHUDWLRQVPD\QRWµFRQWUDGLFW¶&RVWHOOR¶VYLHZWKH\
nonetheleVVµWDNHRQHEH\RQGWKHZRUOGHQYLVDJHG¶E\KHU33 
Without recapitulating &RVWHOOR¶V simplistic view of philosophy, however, 
and even as one recognizes the limits of her discussion of sympathy, one may 
nevertheless take her seriously when she claims that SRHWVUHWXUQWKHµHOHFWULFOLYLQJ
EHLQJ¶WRODQJXDJH (LA, 61). One might take seriously, that is, the notion that there are 
deep relations between our forms of language and the forms of recognition that 
language makes possible (or unwittingly withholds).  
 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VOadder 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was convinced that many of the intractable issues in philosophy 
were misconstruals of language, arising from what Gordon Hunnings has called 
µPLVWDNHQJUDPPDWLFDODVVLPLODWLRQV¶34 Problems in philosophy came about when 
words and concepts from different homes were erroneously mixed up. The task of the 
philosopher, in this context, was to look at the ways this happened and to stop it from 
happening again: 
 
Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible 
wrong turnings. And so we watch one man after another walking down the same 
paths and we know in advance where he will branch off, where walk straight on 
without noticing the side turning, etc. etc. What I have to do then is erect signposts at 
all the junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people past the danger 
points.35 
 
*LYHQWKHVWDWHRIODQJXDJH¶VURDGVZKHUHµZURQJWXUQLQJV¶ZHUHDOOWRRµHDVLO\
DFFHVVLEOH¶WKHSKLORVRSKHU¶VUROHDV:LWWJHQVWHLQFRQFHLYHGLWZDVWRVWRSSHRSOH
from getting lost ± by bringing an end to philosophy as it was understood by the great 
figures of the Western tradition, who were concerned with solving metaphysical or 
epistemological problems. As Wittgenstein puts it in Philosophical Investigations: 
µPhilosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our 
ODQJXDJH¶ (§109). 2UDVKHUHPDUNVLQDODWHUSDVVDJHµ:KDWZHDUHGHVWUR\LQJLV
nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which 
they VWDQG¶(§118). %XWWKHZRUNRIµGHVWUR\LQJ¶DµKRXVHRIFDUGV¶LVQRWDVLPSOH
task. On the contrary, it can involve the terrifying unmaking of ideas and concepts in 
which we felt at home, the abandoning of roads with which we were deeply familiar. 
,Q(OL]DEHWK&RVWHOOR¶VFDVHLWFDQDOVRLQYROYHDIHHOLQJRIout-of-jointedness with 
cultural practLFHVDURXQGKHUDVLQKHULQDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHµVWXSHI\LQJ¶
practices of eating meat, something she once took for granted. It can also involve, 
ILQDOO\DZUHQFKLQJDSDUWRIDVHQVHRIVHOIµ,W¶VWKDW,QRORQJHUNQRZZKHUH,DP,¶
Costello confesses to her son, John, after she has completed her presentation at the 
XQLYHUVLW\µ,PXVWEHPDG¶ (LA, 69). Here, Costello seems to describing a crisis of 
language, as well as the loss of a former understanding of the world, one that is 
deeply frightening.36 Her house of cards comes down with a disorienting swiftness, 
disrupting all the signposts that had once seemed intelligible. She is now travelling, to 
put this another way, without a clear sense of direction, perilously close to the edge of 
VDQLW\$V'LDPRQGZULWHVRIVXFKPRPHQWVµ7RDWWHPSWWRWKLQN>DGLIILFXOW\RI
UHDOLW\@LVWRIHHORQH¶VWKLQNLQJFRPHXQKLQJHG2XUFRQFHSWVRXURUGLQDU\OLIHZLWK
our concepts, pass by this difficulty as if it were not there; the difficulty, if we try to 
VHHLWVKRXOGHUVXVRXWRIOLIHLVGHDGO\FKLOOLQJ¶ (Diamond, 58). Paradoxically, 
KRZHYHUWKLVH[SHULHQFHRIEHLQJµVKRXOGHUHG¶RXWRIOLIHFDQDOVRUHWXUQRQHWROLIH
not least by reminding one of the body one inhabits. Or, as Diamond writes in her 
HVVD\¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKHµFRPLQJDSDUWRIWKRXJKWDQGUHDOLW\ belongs to flesh and 
EORRG¶ (ibid., 78). &RVWHOOR¶VWXUQWRSRHWU\DOVREHORQJVWRµIOHVKDQGEORRG¶. By 
UHDGLQJSRHPVVXFK+XJKHV¶Vµ6HFRQG*ODQFHDWD-DJXDU¶ and by trying to relate to 
animal life beyond the terms provided by philosophy, she brings herself to the limits 
of what she can think.  Not that poetry is without concepts, or that poetry always 
DYRLGVµGHIOHFWLRQ¶, or that avoiding deflection is always even desirable. Nor even that 
Costello wants to put a limit on thinking. On the contrary, her turn to poetry seems to 
signal something else ± FDOOLWDQHPEUDFHRIµQHJDWLYHFDSDELOLW\¶ (John Keats), or an 
acceptance of poesis, that activity of restless making and remaking by which, 
relinquishing what we know, we reclaim the ordinary. Whatever it is, it returns her to 
life. Poets, Costello remarksµUHWXUQWKHOLYLQJHOHFWULFEHLQJWRODQJXDJH¶ 
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